Personal Lending Relationships
利用高管在其他公司的死亡和退休作为外生冲击，发现高管跳槽后，企业更可能选择与新高管有个人关系的银行借款，且这些贷款利差更低、金额更大，尤其在金融危机期间增强了企业财务灵活性，减少了裁员和投资约束。
ABSTRACT I identify the effects of personal relationships on loan contracting using executive deaths and retirements at other firms as a source of exogenous variation in executive turnover. After plausibly exogenous turnover, borrowers choose lenders with which their new executives have personal relationships 4.1 times as frequently, and loans from these lenders have 20 basis points lower spreads and 12.5% larger amounts. Personal relationships benefit firms across loan terms, especially during macroeconomic downturns. Increased financial flexibility from personal relationships insulated firms from financial shocks during the recent financial crisis: they exhibited less constrained investment and were less likely to layoff employees.