Value of Persistent Information
研究了在严格利益冲突的战略情境中，信息优势的价值如何取决于信息的持久性，通过随机零和博弈形式化，并刻画了马尔可夫算子上的偏序关系。
We develop a theory of how the value of an agent's information advantage depends on the persistence of information. We focus on strategic situations with strict conflict of interest, formalized as stochastic zero‐sum games where only one of the players observes the state that evolves according to a Markov operator. Operator Q is said to be better for the informed player than operator P if the value of the game under Q is higher than under P regardless of the stage game. We show that this defines a convex partial order on the space of ergodic Markov operators. Our main result is a full characterization of this partial order, intepretable as an ordinal notion of persistence relevant for games. The analysis relies on a novel characterization of the value of a stochastic game with incomplete information.