On the Effectiveness of Loan‐to‐Value Regulation in a Multiconstraint Framework
基于瑞典微观数据，研究当借款人同时面临抵押品约束和偿债收入比约束时，收紧贷款价值比上限可能无法降低债务与GDP之比，反而推高房价。
Abstract Models in the infinite horizon macro‐housing literature often assume that borrowers are constrained exclusively by the loan‐to‐value (LTV) ratio. Motivated by the Swedish microdata, I explore an alternative arrangement where borrowers are constrained by a collateral constraint and by a debt‐service‐to‐income ratio. While stricter LTV limits are often considered as a measure to tackle the rise in household indebtedness, I find that policy designed to lower the maximum permissible LTV ratio may actually leave the debt‐to‐GDP ratio unchanged and increase housing prices in equilibrium if borrowers are bound by two constraints at the same time.