Constrained listening, audience alignment, and expert communication
研究两个发送者与偏好异质的连续接收者之间的廉价谈话，接收者只能选择听其中一位发送者，分析引入第二位发送者如何促进信息传递，并评估发送者受众规模、信息量及偏见对接收者行动的影响。
Abstract We consider a cheap‐talk setting with two senders and a continuum of receivers with heterogenous preferences. Each receiver is constrained to listen to one of the senders but can choose which sender to listen to. The introduction of a second sender facilitates more informative communication and even enables full communication for a large set of sender preference pairs. We use the model to assess the size and characteristics of sender audiences, the amount of information communicated, and the impact of the senders' biases on the receivers' actions.