Bail Out or Work Out? Theoretical Considerations
用理论模型评估了应对资本账户危机的几种方案，发现支付暂停和最后贷款人贷款对流动性危机同样有效，而债务减记比补贴性IMF融资更适合处理偿付危机。
The views are not necessarily those of the Bank of England or Her Majesty’s Treasury. We would like to thank Charles Goodhart, Adrian Penalver, David Vines, and seminar participants at the Bank of England for comments. 2 In recent years, we appear to have entered an era of capital account crises. In response, a number of new crisis resolution ideas have been put forward, including the establishment of supranational institutions such as an international lender of last resort or an international bankruptcy court, temporary payments standstills and the inclusion of collective action clauses in debt contracts. This paper assesses these proposals using a theoretical model of crisis. The model underscores the importance of adapting policy interventions to the nature of the crisis at hand. For example, it finds that payments standstills and last-resort lending are an equally efficient means of dealing with liquidity crises, both ex-ante and ex-post, while creditor committees are second-best. It finds that debt-write-downs are a preferred means of dealing with solvency crises than subsidized IMF financing because of the negative moral hazard implications of the latter tool. And it finds that international bankruptcy court proposals may be superior to contractual approaches in securing such write-downs.