Incentivizing Better Quality of Care: The Role of Medicaid and Competition in the Nursing Home Industry
研究了提高医疗补助报销率或增加本地竞争对养老院护理质量的影响，发现提高报销率比促进竞争更能有效提升护理质量。
This paper develops a model of the nursing home industry to investigate the quality effects of policies that either raise regulated reimbursement rates or increase local competition. Using data from Pennsylvania, I estimate the parameters of the model. The findings indicate that nursing homes increase the quality of care, measured by the number of skilled nurses per resident, by 8.7 percent following a universal 10 percent increase in Medicaid reimbursement rates. In contrast, I find that pro-competitive policies lead to only small increases in skilled nurse staffing ratios, suggesting that Medicaid increases are more cost effective in raising the quality of care.