Repeated implementation with overlapping generations of agents
研究了代际重叠模型中社会选择函数的重复实施问题，发现当代理人偏好不变且寿命足够长时，满足一致同意条件的社会选择函数可重复实施；若偏好每期变化，则只有有效率的函数可实施。
Abstract We study repeated implementation in a model with overlapping generations of agents. A social choice function selects an alternative in each period as a function of preferences of those agents who are alive in that period. When the agents’ preferences do not change during their lifetime, we show that any social choice function satisfying a mild unanimity condition is repeatedly implementable in subgame perfect equilibrium if there are at least three agents and they live sufficiently long. When the agents’ preferences change every period, we show that only efficient social choice functions can be repeatedly implementable if the agents live sufficiently long.