Hayek, Local Information, and Commanding Heights: Decentralizing State-Owned Enterprises in China
基于哈耶克的地方信息理论，研究中国国企分权化决策：政府距离越远、沟通成本越高、企业绩效差异越大，国企越可能分权；但中央对战略行业的管控会削弱这一关系。
Hayek (1945) argues that local information is key to understanding the efficiency of alternative economic systems and whether production should be centralized or decentralized. The Chinese experience of decentralizing SOEs confirms this insight: when the distance to the government is farther, the SOE is more likely to be decentralized, and this distance-decentralization link is more pronounced with higher communication costs and greater firm-performance heterogeneity. However, when the Chinese central government oversees SOEs in strategic industries, the distance-decentralization link is muted. We also consider alternative agency-cost-based explanations, and do not find much support.