Incentives and the Supply of Effective Charter Schools
研究发现，特许学校按人头统一拨款的政策导致学校倾向于服务低成本的生源。通过构建学校供给与竞争的均衡模型，模拟显示成本调整后的拨款公式能增加弱势学生比例，且不显著降低整体效果。
Charter school funding is typically set by formulas that provide the same amount for students regardless of advantage or need. I present evidence that this policy skews the distribution of students served by charters toward low-cost populations by influencing where charter schools open and whether they survive. To do this, I develop and estimate an equilibrium model of charter school supply and competition to evaluate the effects of funding policies that aim to correct these incentives. The results indicate that a cost-adjusted funding formula would increase the share of disadvantaged students in charter schools with little reduction in aggregate effectiveness.