Multi-lateral strategic bargaining without stationarity
证明了一类广泛的多边序贯讨价还价博弈在纯策略中存在子博弈完美均衡，无需平稳性假设，仅要求效用函数在结果空间上连续，适用于任意甚至时变的讨价还价协议、外部性和利他偏好。
This paper establishes existence of subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies for a general class of sequential multi-lateral bargaining games, without assuming a stationary setting. The only required hypothesis is that utility functions are continuous on the space of economic outcomes. In particular, no assumption on the space of feasible payoffs is needed. The result covers arbitrary and even time-varying bargaining protocols (acceptance rules), externalities, and other-regarding preferences. As a side result, we clarify the meaning of assumptions on “continuity at infinity.”