The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule
首次深入解释政府如何在生产性公共投资和群体歧视性再分配之间权衡，将现实社会视为理想民主与完美独裁的混合体，分析政府如何结合政治与经济计算来平衡这些竞争性选择。
Productive public good investment allocations, and group discriminatory redistributions are conflicting resource use options between which every government must choose irrespective of its political make up. This paper is the first to derive an incisive explanation of how governments combine political and economic calculation to balance these competing choices. Realistic societies can be analyzed as a mixture of two polar cases — idealized, utopian, consensual democracy and perfect autocracy. Thus, in making the choice between social investment and redistributive taxation every government behaves somewhat like an pure democracy and somewhat like a selfish dictatorship.