Efficient dynamic mechanisms in environments with interdependent valuations: The role of contingent transfers
研究了在估值相互依赖且私人信息随时间演变的动态环境中，如何设计高效且激励相容的直接机制，发现历史依赖的转移支付是关键，并揭示了与经典VCG机制的联系。
This paper addresses the problem of implementing socially efficient allocations in dynamic environments with interdependent valuations and evolving private information. In the case where the agents' information is correlated across time, we construct efficient and incentive compatible direct dynamic mechanisms. Unlike the mechanisms with history-independent transfers in the existing literature, these mechanisms feature history-dependent transfers. Moreover, they are reminiscent of the classical Vickrey-Clarke-Grove (VCG) mechanism, even though the latter is not incentive compatible with interdependent valuations. We further show that the VCG aspect of the direct mechanisms suggests natural ways for implementation in some repeated auctions.