Allocation to Anchor Investors, Underpricing, and the After‐Market Performance of IPOs
研究了两阶段IPO中锚定投资者配售与抑价的负向因果关系，发现锚定投资者倾向投资估值不确定的难发行股票，且声誉好的锚定投资者配售与锁定期到期前收益正相关，支持信息揭示和定向投资者理论。
Abstract We study bidding by anchor investors in a two‐stage initial public offering (IPO) process and document a negative, causal relation between allocation to anchor investors and underpricing. We find that anchor investors are likely to invest in hard‐to‐place offerings characterized by valuation uncertainty. We also document a positive relation between allocation to reputed anchor investors and returns up to lock‐up expiration. Our evidence provides support for information revelation and targeting specific investors’ theories of book building. Anchor‐backed IPOs earn superior returns mainly due to monitoring. Who bids in an IPO seems to matter just as particular types of bids do.