Lone wolves in competitive equilibria
在可转移效用交换经济模型中证明了经典匹配理论中“独狼定理”的类似结论：任何在某个竞争均衡中不参与交易的个体，在所有竞争均衡中都会得到其自给自足收益。
Abstract This paper develops a class of equilibrium-independent predictions of competitive equilibrium with indivisibilities. Specifically, we prove an analogue of the “Lone Wolf Theorem” of classical matching theory for the Baldwin and Klemperer (Econometrica 87(3):867–932, 2019) model of exchange economies with transferable utility, showing that any agent who does not participate in trade in some competitive equilibrium must receive her autarky payoff in every competitive equilibrium. Our results extend to approximate equilibria and to settings in which utility is only approximately transferable.