The Social Value of Information: A Test of a Beauty and Nonbeauty Contest
提出一种方法，利用多国利率调查预测数据，检验公共与私人信息的精度及其对福利的影响，发现多数国家中公共信息精度提高能增加福利，尤其适用于小型开放和新兴市场经济体。
Abstract We demonstrate how the precision of public and private information can be measured and their welfare implications can be assessed. To this end, we develop and apply a procedure to test welfare results from a beauty and nonbeauty contest model based on survey forecasts of interest rates in a large country sample over an extended period of time. In most countries, interest rate forecasts are unbiased. In half of the countries, a higher precision of public information regarding interest rates increases welfare. This applies in particular to small open and emerging market economies. During forward guidance, public information is less precise than private information. On average, forecasters place greater weight on public than private information and rapidly correct errors contained in private information, while errors in public information last over the whole forecast horizon.