Having a Finger in the Pie: Labor Power and Corporate Payout Policy
利用39个国家的劳动法时间序列数据，研究发现加强劳动力权力的立法变化会减少企业分红和总支付，且这种效应在劳动密集型企业、集体谈判覆盖广和法律执行强的国家更显著。
Abstract Exploiting time‐series data on labor laws from 39 countries, we investigate how labor power influences firms’ payouts. We find that legislative changes that strengthen labor power reduce firms’ dividend payments and total payouts. The payout restriction effect of labor power is more pronounced in firms with greater labor intensity and in firms operating in countries with broader collective bargaining coverage and more effective law enforcement. Tightened operating flexibility and excess wage extraction are two plausible channels through which labor power affects payouts. These findings indicate that labor power is another important country‐wide institution that shapes corporate payout policy.