Firm Competition and CEO Turnover: Evidence from US Railroad Deregulation
利用1980年《斯塔格斯铁路法案》放松管制作为外生冲击，研究发现放松管制后铁路行业CEO更替率上升，CEO的教育背景和工作经验发生变化，且企业绩效仅在管制时期影响CEO更替。
Abstract In this article, I examine how changes in the competitive environment of firms affect matches between chief executive officers (CEOs) and firms. I exploit the 1980 Staggers Rail Act, which drastically deregulated the freight railroad industry, as a source of arguably exogenous variation in the operating environment. Using hand‐collected data, I obtain three main findings: first, CEO turnover rates increase; second, relative to utility firms, railroad CEOs have more business education and show broader work experience after deregulation; and third, firm performance leads to CEO turnover only during the regulated period.