Accounting Losses as a Heuristic for Managerial Failure: Evidence from CEO Turnovers
研究发现会计亏损与CEO更替正相关，亏损提供了管理能力的增量信息，董事会据此评估管理者，这解释了为何CEO会通过盈余管理避免亏损。
We study the effects of accounting losses on chief executive officer (CEO) turnover. If accounting losses provide incremental information about managerial ability, boards can utilize the information in losses to assess CEOs’ stewardship of assets, which is why losses may serve as a heuristic for managerial failure. We find a positive relation between losses and subsequent CEO turnover after controlling for other accounting and stock-performance measures. We also find that losses are associated with an increase in board activity and that losses predict poor operating performance and future financial problems. Our results explain why CEOs manage earnings to avoid losses.