Experimenting with Career Concerns
研究了经理人因担心声誉受损而延迟终止亏损项目的行为，发现当经理从坏消息（如违约）中学习时，扭曲程度随预期质量和信息不完美程度增加而增加。
A manager who learns privately about a project over time may want to delay quitting it if recognizing failure/lack of success hurts his reputation. In the banking industry, managers may want to roll over bad loans. How do distortions depend on expected project quality? What are the effects of releasing public information about quality? A key feature of banks is that managers learn about project quality from bad news, i.e., a default. We show that in such an environment, distortions tend to increase with expected quality and imperfect information about quality. Results differ if managers instead learn from good news.