An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects: Comment
指出Ausubel（2004）提出的多物品升价拍卖中，所有竞拍者诚实出价并非事后完美均衡，并提供了一个反例，随后修改了该拍卖规则以确保均衡成立。
Ausubel (2004) introduces a new ascending-bid auction rule for multiple homogeneous objects, called the Ausubel auction, which is a dynamic counterpart of the Vickrey auction. He claims that in the Ausubel auction with private values, sincere bidding by all bidders is an ex post perfect equilibrium. However, we show that this claim does not hold in general by providing a counterexample. We then modify the Ausubel auction so that sincere bidding by all bidders is an ex post perfect equilibrium.