Asset Encumbrance, Bank Funding, and Fragility
研究了银行在面临展期风险时如何选择资产抵押比例，权衡低成本长期担保债务的收益与无担保债务挤兑带来的脆弱性成本，并分析了存款保险等政策对过度抵押和脆弱性的影响。
We propose a model of asset encumbrance by banks subject to rollover risk and study the consequences for fragility, funding costs, and prudential regulation. An bank's choice of encumbrance trades off the benefit of expanding profitable investment funded by cheap long-term secured debt against the cost of greater fragility due to unsecured debt runs. We derive several testable implications about privately optimal encumbrance ratios. Deposit insurance or wholesale funding guarantees induce excessive encumbrance and exacerbate fragility. We show how regulations such as explicit limits on encumbrance ratios and revenue-neutral Pigovian taxes can mitigate the risk-shifting incentives of banks.