Regulatory competition and rules/principles‐based regulation
分析了监管竞争如何影响基于原则和基于规则的监管体系，发现监管竞争可能导致逐底竞争和社会有害的监管套利，并探讨了监管协调和公司游说的福利效应。
Abstract This paper analyses how regulatory competition affects principles‐based and rules‐based systems of regulation. Competition between regulators creates the possibility of regulatory arbitrage that generates a race to the bottom by regulators that is socially harmful. We derive the welfare effects of such competition and the regulatory response to these effects, in particular, regulatory harmonisation. We find, however, that regulators can adopt harmful regulatory harmonisation. These effects can make coordination efforts in developing global regulation socially desirable. We demonstrate, moreover, that corporate lobbying is not always harmful: it can both encourage and discourage socially desirable regulation.