The Effect of Financial Reporting Quality on Corporate Investment Efficiency: Evidence from the Adoption of SFAS No. 123R
研究了SFAS No. 123R要求将员工股票期权成本按公允价值确认而非披露后，财务报告质量提升如何减少企业投资不足，尤其对受新准则影响大的公司效果更明显。
We test for changes in investment efficiency around a shock to financial reporting quality—the adoption of SFAS No. 123R, which requires that employee stock option (ESO) costs be recognized rather than disclosed at fair value. We predict and find a reduction in underinvestment for firms heavily affected by the new standard, and these firms exhibit a decrease in the bid–ask spread and an increase in new capital raised in the post-SFAS No. 123R period. The reduction in underinvestment is more pronounced for firms whose ESO estimates are more unreliable before SFAS No. 123R, for firms that are financially constrained, and for firms with more entrenched managers. These findings are consistent with recognition of ESO costs at fair value improving financial reporting quality, which, in turn, enhances investment efficiency through the mitigation of the adverse selection problem for underinvesting firms.The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3045 . This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting.