PRIZE‐BASED MECHANISMS FOR FUND‐RAISING: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTS
研究了在捐赠者为已知价值的奖金竞争时，私人提供公共品的最优机制设计，通过理论分析和实验室实验比较了彩票和全支付拍卖等机制的筹款效果。
We study the optimal design of mechanisms for the private provision of public goods in a setting in which donors compete for a prize of commonly known value. We discuss equilibrium bidding in mechanisms that promote both conditional cooperation and competition (i.e., the lottery and the all‐pay auction with the lowest‐bid payment rule) and rank their fund‐raising performance vis‐à‐vis their standard (pay‐your‐own‐bid) counterparts. The theoretically optimal mechanism in this model is the lowest‐price all‐pay auction—an auction in which the highest bidder wins the prize and all bidders pay the lowest bid. The highest amount for the public good is generated in the unique, symmetric, mixed‐strategy equilibrium of this auction. In the laboratory, the theoretically optimal mechanism generates the highest level of donations with three bidders but not with two bidders.