Efficient partnership formation in networks
研究了社交网络中个体如何通过互惠形成长期伙伴关系，发现关键节点（在最大匹配中不可或缺的节点）能避免孤立风险并获得更高收益，其行为驱动了全局高效伙伴关系的形成。
We analyze the formation of partnerships in social networks. Players need favors at random times and ask their neighbors in the network to form exclusive long‐term partnerships that guarantee reciprocal favor exchange. Refusing to provide a favor results in the automatic removal of the underlying link. Players agree to provide the first favor in a partnership only if they otherwise face the risk of eventual isolation. In equilibrium, players essential for realizing every maximum matching can avoid this risk and enjoy higher payoffs than inessential players. Although the search for partners is decentralized and reflects local partnership opportunities, the strength of essential players drives efficient partnership formation in every network. Equilibrium behavior is determined by the classification of nodes in the Gallai–Edmonds decomposition of the underlying network.