Identifying the Harm of Manipulable School-Choice Mechanisms
研究首次直接测量学生在择校中是否按真实偏好排序（真诚型）还是操纵偏好（策略型），发现策略型学生被分配到偏好学校的概率高9.6个百分点，原因在于他们系统性地避开过度需求的学校。
An important but under-explored issue in student assignment procedures is heterogeneity in the level of strategic sophistication among students. Our work provides the first direct measure of which students rank schools following their true preference order (sincere students) and which rank schools by manipulating their true preferences (sophisticated students). We present evidence that our proxy for sophistication captures systematic differences among students. Our results demonstrate that sophisticated students are 9.6 percentage points more likely to be assigned to one of their preferred schools. Further, we show that this large difference in assignment probability occurs because sophisticated students systematically avoid over-demanded schools.