Endogenous Persuasion with Costly Verification
研究发送者通过公开或私下实验产生证据来说服接收者，接收者可以付费验证实验设计，发现公开实验在无限制时沟通失败，而私下实验可实现说服。
Abstract In this paper, I study a situation in which a sender tries to persuade a receiver with evidence that is generated via public or private experimentation. Under public experimentation, any experimental outcome is revealed, and under private experimentation the sender can hide adverse outcomes. The sender can design the properties of the experiments. The receiver chooses whether to verify at a cost the design of the experiment with which the revealed outcome was generated. I find that communication breaks down under public experimentation if there is no restriction on the experiment's design, and that persuasion is possible under private experimentation.