Fiscal stability during the Great Recession: putting decentralization design to the test
利用1995-2014年OECD国家数据，实证分析财政分权水平与设计（包括地方借贷规则和财政责任法）对国家财政稳定的影响，发现更高分权水平有益于财政表现，但垂直财政失衡会削弱这一效果。
This paper provides an empirical analysis aimed at disentangling the roles played by decentralization level and design as well as the extended decentralized framework provided by subnational borrowing rules and fiscal responsibility laws on a country’s fiscal stability. Using Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries’ data from the period 1995–2014, strong regularities are found regarding the effects of decentralization, even during the recent Great Recession. Higher levels of fiscal decentralization have a beneficiary effect on fiscal performance, but the positive impact erodes rapidly with the level of vertical fiscal imbalance. Other fiscal institutions shaping decentralization design, such as borrowing and other fiscal rules, can also contribute to foster fiscal stability.