Honest Equilibria in Reputation Games: The Role of Time Preferences
研究在声誉博弈中，当一方拥有关于时间偏好的私人信息时，是否存在诚实均衡，既能完全揭示信息又支持合作，避免违约和冲突。
New relationships are often plagued with uncertainty because one of the players has some private information about her “type.” The reputation literature has shown that equilibria that reveal this private information typically involve breach of trust and conflict. But are these inevitable for equilibrium learning? I analyze self-enforcing relationships where one party is privately informed about her time preferences. I show that there always exist honest reputation equilibria, which fully reveal information and support cooperation without breach or conflict. I compare these to dishonest reputation equilibria from several perspectives. My results are applicable to a broad class of repeated games.