Multiple Activities in Networks
研究了一个网络模型，其中个体在两种相互依赖的活动（替代或互补）中付出努力，完整刻画了任意网络结构下的纳什均衡，并分析了生产率和网络密度对均衡的影响。
We consider a network model where individuals exert efforts in two types of activities that are interdependent. These activities can be either substitutes or complements. We provide a full characterization of the Nash equilibrium of this game for any network structure. We show, in particular, that quadratic games with linear best-reply functions aggregate nicely to multiple activities because equilibrium efforts obey similar formulas to that of the one-activity case. We then derive some comparative-statics results showing how own productivity affects equilibrium efforts and how network density impacts equilibrium outcomes.