EXCESS CAPACITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF POLICY INTERVENTIONS: EVIDENCE FROM THE CEMENT INDUSTRY
研究了日本水泥行业中的产能协调政策，发现强制企业同时减少产能并未增加市场势力或扭曲报废决策，而是提高了剩余工厂的利用率。
Abstract Strategic interaction among firms may hinder the reduction of excess capacity in a declining industry. Policy interventions that attempt to reduce excess capacity may increase efficiency by accelerating the capital adjustment but may decrease efficiency by increasing the market power of firms and/or by distorting firms' divestment decisions. We study capacity coordination policies—forcing firms to reduce their capacity simultaneously —applied to the Japanese cement industry. Estimation results suggest that these interventions did not increase market power because reduction in capacity resulted in higher utilization of the remaining plants, and did not distort firms' scrappage decisions.