Fair Pay and a Wage‐Bill Argument for Low Real Wage Cyclicality and Excessive Employment Variability
构建两期最优契约模型，分析企业在新雇佣中不能歧视的约束下，工资缺乏灵活性导致就业效率低下，在坏状态下雇佣过少，失业是非自愿的，并可能伴随过度解雇。
This article considers a two-period optimal contracting model in which firms make new hires in the second period subject to the constraint that they cannot pay discriminate either against or in favour of the new hires. In the absence of fully contingent contracts, it is shown that wages are less flexible than needed for efficient employment levels, with the result that too few hires are made in bad states of the world. Unemployment is involuntary. In an extension to the model, there may also be involuntary and excessive layoffs in some states of the world. Copyright 2005 Royal Economic Society.