The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics
构建了一个理论框架，说明市场管制和税收的“政策选择”受制于过去在法律和财政能力上的投资，并研究了这些投资的经济和政治决定因素，发现法律与财政能力通常是互补的，共同利益公共品、政治稳定和包容性政治制度有助于国家能力建设。
Economists generally assume that the state has sufficient institutional capacity to support markets and levy taxes. This paper develops a framework where “policy choices” in market regulation and taxation are constrained by past investments in legal and fiscal capacity. It studies the economic and political determinants of such investments, demonstrating that legal and fiscal capacity are typically complements. The results show that, among other things, common interest public goods, such as fighting external wars, as well as political stability and inclusive political institutions, are conducive to building state capacity. Some correlations in cross-country data are consistent with the theory.