Agencies’ formal independence and credible commitment in the Latin American regulatory state: A comparative analysis of 8 countries and 13 sectors
基于8个国家104个监管机构的数据，检验了正式独立性的功能性和制度性解释，发现私有化并非显著决定因素，而否决行为者和民主化与独立性正相关。
Abstract This article tests functional and institutional explanations for the different levels of formal independence of regulatory agencies in Latin America. The analysis is grounded in an original database of the formal independence level of 104 regulators in 8 countries and 13 regulatory sectors. The results challenge a central claim of the credible commitment hypothesis as they indicate that privatization is not a significant determinant of agency independence nor are utility regulators more likely to be independent than other economic regulators. Veto players are positively correlated with formal independence, indicating that in developing countries they operate together as credibility‐enhancing mechanisms, rather than as functional equivalents, as previous studies on developed countries have shown. Democratization is positively correlated with formal independence, whereas trade opening and vulnerability to international pressures has no significant impact. Hence, this article enhances the understanding of the delegation of regulatory powers to formally independent agencies in developing countries.