Optimal Insurance Policy Indemnity Schedules With Policyholders’ Limited Liability and Background Risk
研究了在保单持有人有限责任和背景风险下，最优保险赔偿安排如何设计，发现灾难损失下的福利补贴可能使保费变得“过度公平”，而相关背景风险会改变其对最优保险的影响方向。
Abstract This article makes two contributions to the insurance literature by studying optimal insurance policy indemnity schedules with policyholders’ limited liability and background risk. First, generalizing a prominent approach by Huberman, Mayers, and Smith (1983), it is shown that a welfare subsidy in the case of a ruinous loss may make the insurance premium “overly fair” for nonbankrupting losses and full insurance for this event becomes optimal. Second, introducing correlated background risk into this limited liability framework relativizes or even turns results by Doherty and Schlesinger (1983) as to the impact of background risk on optimal coverage into its opposite.