Board Members With Style: The Effect of Audit Committee Members and Their Personal Styles on Financial Reporting Choices
研究审计委员会成员和主席的个人风格是否影响公司财务报告实践，发现其固定效应能显著解释会计错报和盈余管理的概率，且不能被CEO或CFO的影响所解释。
This article studies whether audit committee members and chairpersons exhibit individual-specific “styles” that affect corporate financial reporting practices. I track 2,941 audit committee members and 683 chairpersons across firms over time, and test whether member (chair)-specific factors explain firms’ accounting choices. I find that member and chairperson “style” (captured by fixed effects) is significant in explaining a firm’s probability of accounting misstatements and earnings management, and the effects are not explained away by observable member (chairperson) characteristics found by prior literature, or by the effects of CEOs or CFOs.