SEARCH, ADVERSE SELECTION, AND MARKET CLEARING
研究了在搜索摩擦消失的极限下，拥有产品质量私人信息的卖方与买方之间的动态分散交易模型，发现市场是否出清取决于代理人耐心与关系解散率的比值是否超过阈值。
Abstract We examine a dynamic decentralized trading model with infinitesimal sellers and buyers to investigate whether or not the market fails to clear in the limit of search friction vanishing. A seller, who has private information about product quality, and a buyer are matched to bargain over price. They form a long‐term relationship if they reach agreement. They return to the matching pool if they fail to agree or the existing relationship is dissolved. The market fails to clear if and only if the ratio of agents' patience over the dissolution rate exceeds a threshold.