Stock vesting conditions, control benefits and managerial replacement
研究了股票薪酬的归属条件如何影响企业更换经理人的决策，发现长期和短期归属的股票薪酬都可能导致过度更换，而短期归属期权则可能造成过度留任。
Abstract This article considers the effect of vesting conditions of stock‐based compensation on firms’ decisions to replace managers. I indicate that firms may excessively replace managers with both long‐ and short‐term vested stock‐based compensation, while excessive retention can be caused only by short‐term vested options. If the discount factor is sufficiently small, I also show that short‐term vested stock‐based compensation is the equilibrium contract. The study also has implications for regulations concerning mandatory deferral and clawback of executive pay.