Bidding with Securities: Auctions and Security Design
研究投标人用证券投标的拍卖，证券支付取决于资产实现价值，分析正式与非正式拍卖中的均衡、收益及证券设计的影响。
We study security-bid auctions in which bidders compete for an asset by bidding with securities whose payments are contingent on the asset's realized value. In formal security-bid auctions, the seller restricts the security design to an ordered set and uses a standard auction format (e.g., first- or second-price). In informal settings, bidders offer arbitrary securities and the seller chooses the most attractive bid, based on his beliefs, ex post. We characterize equilibrium and show that steeper securities yield higher revenues, that auction formats can be ranked based on the security design, and that informal auctions lead to the lowest possible revenues.