Autonomous bureaucrats in independent bureaucracies? Loyalty perceptions within supreme audit institutions
研究最高审计机构官员的忠诚感知，通过Q方法识别出四种类型，他们否认对政治任命者或外部利益相关者的传统忠诚，而遵守宪法、专业规则及所属审计机构，且忠诚感知与工作成果相关。
The independence of Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) is essential to their effectiveness, yet the actual autonomy of SAIs auditors can be questioned. To whom do SAI officials owe their loyalty? To what extent are their loyalty perceptions reflected in their auditing reports? Our comparative study triangulates interviews, direct observations, and documents and, based on Q methodology, constructs four types of SAI officials who disavow traditional loyalties to political appointees or external stakeholders but abide to Constitutional and professional rules as well as to their respective audit institutions. Loyalty perceptions reflect SAIs’ associational contexts and are related to different work outcomes.