Macroprodential Policy under Uncertainty
本文挑战了Brainard的经典结论，认为宏观审慎政策效果的不确定性不一定会使政策制定者更谨慎，反而在多种复杂情况下可能促使更积极的政策行动。
We argue that uncertainty over the impact of macroprudential policy need not make a policymaker more cautious. Our starting point is the classic finding of Brainard that uncertainty over the impact of a policy instrument will make a policymaker less active. This result is challenged in a series of richer models designed to take into account the more complex reality faced by a macroprudential policymaker. We find that asymmetries in policy objectives, the presence of unquantifiable sources of risk, the ability to learn from policy, and private-sector uncertainty over policy objectives can all lead to more active policy.