Optimal Redistributive Income Taxation and Efficiency Wages*
将效率工资设定与最优再分配所得税理论结合，分析高低技能两类劳动力市场下的最优边际税率，发现高技能者边际税率在合理假设下为负，低技能者税率可正可负，失业补助有助于放松自我选择约束。
Abstract In this paper, we integrate efficiency wage setting with the theory of optimal redistributive income taxation. In doing so, we use a model with two skill types, where efficiency wage setting characterizes the labor market faced by the low‐skilled, whereas the high‐skilled face a conventional, competitive labor market. We show that the marginal income tax implemented for the high‐skilled is negative under plausible assumptions. The marginal income tax facing the low‐skilled can be either positive or negative, in general. An increase in unemployment benefits contributes to a relaxation of the binding self‐selection constraint, which makes this instrument particularly useful from the perspective of redistribution.