Health spending, savings and fertility in a lifecycle‐dynastic model with longevity externalities
研究了寿命外部性如何导致过度健康支出、储蓄不足和过高生育率，并分析了社会保障和健康补贴等政策对健康支出、储蓄和生育率的影响，基于美国数据给出了数值结果。
Abstract We investigate health spending, savings, fertility and policy implications in a lifecycle‐dynastic model with longevity externalities in annuity returns. We show that such externalities engender not only excessive health spending but also under‐saving and excessive fertility. Social security and health subsidization increase health spending and savings but reduce fertility from laissez‐faire levels. A publicly funded universal health system under labour‐income taxation raises fertility. Taxing health spending or using social security and public health together can obtain socially optimal health spending, savings, longevity and fertility. Numerical results based on US observations suggest substantial variations among these cases, especially in old‐age health spending.