New Hampshire Effect: behavior in sequential and simultaneous multi-battle contests
实验室研究发现，序贯多战场竞赛中的总支出显著高于同步竞赛，这源于各战场的过度支出，与理论预测相反；沉没成本谬误和获胜效用是两种互补解释。
Abstract Sequential multi-battle contests are predicted to induce lower expenditure than simultaneous contests. This prediction is a result of a “New Hampshire Effect”—a strategic advantage created by the winner of the first battle. Although our laboratory study provides evidence for the New Hampshire Effect, we find that sequential contests generate significantly higher (not lower) expenditure than simultaneous contests. This is mainly because in sequential contests, there is significant over-expenditure in all battles. We suggest sunk cost fallacy and utility of winning as two complementary explanations for this behavior and provide supporting evidence.