Consequences of Increased Compensation Disclosure Transparency: Evidence From CEO Pay in Acquiring Firms
研究2006年SEC薪酬披露新规后，收购公司CEO薪酬对并购后差绩效的敏感性增强，表明更透明的薪酬披露有助于改善经理人与股东利益的一致性。
We investigate the consequences of increased compensation disclosure transparency on the pay for chief executive officers (CEOs) in firms that are more prone to a misalignment between manager and shareholder interests. Prior research documents that acquiring CEOs’ pay is insensitive to poor post-deal performance after firms complete large acquisitions. Using the 2006 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) compensation disclosure regulation as our empirical setting, we find that this result disappears after firms begin to provide more transparent compensation disclosure. Our cross-sectional analyses show that acquiring firms with higher quality compensation disclosure exhibit greater CEO pay sensitivity to poor post-deal performance after 2006. Our findings indicate that increased compensation disclosure transparency helps strengthen the relation between CEO pay and poor performance in acquiring firms.