The value of trade credit with rebate contract in a capital-constrained supply chain
研究了资金充裕的制造商向资金受限的零售商提供一种结合贸易信贷、最低订购量和销售返利的创新合同（TCRC），并与传统贸易信贷融资（TTCF）模型比较，发现TCRC在定价策略上更优。
We investigate the value of an innovative trade credit with rebate contract (TCRC) model in a stylised supply chain. In this supply chain, the capital-abundant manufacturer offers an integrated contract involving trade credit, minimum ordering and sales rebate contract to a capital-constrained retailer. To highlight the value of the TCRC model, we compare it with a traditional trade credit financing (TTCF) model in a ‘selling to the newsvendor model’. First, we show that equilibrium strategies exist between the manufacturer and the retailer under the TCRC or TTCF model. Second, this study investigates equilibrium selection between the TCRC and TTCF models for the individual and the supply chain. Finally, we show the manufacturer’s pricing policy, wherein the TCRC model outperforms the TTCF model for the players. Furthermore, we conduct a set of numerical experiments to show evidence for theoretical analysis and measure the operation efficiency of the TCRC model for players in the supply chain.