COMPARING PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS
对比了公共采购中常用的两种拍卖形式：第一价格拍卖和平均价拍卖，发现平均价拍卖通常效率更低，并利用意大利公共采购数据量化了效率损失。
Abstract This article contrasts two auction formats often used in public procurement: first price auctions with ex post screening of bid responsiveness and average bid auctions (ABAs), in which the bidder closest to the average bid wins. The equilibrium analysis reveals that their ranking is ambiguous in terms of revenues, but the ABA is typically less efficient. Using a data set of Italian public procurement auctions run alternately under the two formats, a structural model of bidding is estimated for the subsample of first price auctions and used to quantify the efficiency loss under counterfactual ABAs.