How Angel Know-How Shapes Ownership Sharing in Stage-Based Contracts
基于管家理论，研究投资者在分阶段融资中提供知识如何影响企业家的所有权份额，发现知识对份额有直接和间接的相反效应，为涉及投资者知识的投资合同设计提供启示。
We draw upon stewardship theory to formally derive bounds on the investment amount in a business prospect, and to characterize ownership sharing when investors offer two-stage financing along with know-how to increase the prospect’s valuation. In the early-development stage, we show that the direct effect of investor know-how increases the entrepreneur’s share while the indirect effect from that know-how due to its interaction with the investment size, decreases it. In the subsequent growth stage, the direct effect decreases the entrepreneur’s share while the indirect effect increases it. These tradeoffs offer theoretical and practical implications for writing investment contracts involving investor know-how.