“I Intend Therefore to Prorogue”: the effects of political conflict and the Glorious Revolution in parliament, 1660–1702
本文研究光荣革命如何消除17世纪英国改变产权的政治障碍，通过分析议会地产法案的通过情况，发现君主突然休会导致法案失败，而光荣革命后的政治变革改善了立法供给，促进了经济发展。
This paper provides evidence that the Glorious Revolution removed political barriers to changing property rights in seventeenth century England. I study parliament's passage of estate bills, a legislation that broke restrictions on land use and made up most of parliament's legislative output from to . Using a new dataset on estate bills, I first document that the sudden closure (prorogation) of parliament by the monarch caused bills to fail. Probit and OLS estimates show estate bills were percentage points more likely to fail in these sessions. Second, I show conflict delaying revenue bills and conflict with the monarch's interests made sudden prorogations more likely before the Glorious Revolution. Political and constitutional changes with the Glorious Revolution were thus important for England's economic development. They improved parliament's provision of legislation that made property rights more flexible to changing economic opportunities throughout the preindustrial era.