Banks and Corporate Decisions: Evidence from Business Groups
研究了银行如何通过影响客户公司治理，促使客户进行并购以降低自身风险。基于日本1990年代银行业危机期间的并购数据，发现与银行关系更强的收购方在并购中损失更多股东价值，而银行股东却获得超额回报。
Abstract Banks who can influence clients' governance may steer those clients into mergers to reduce the banks' own risk. Empirical evidence based on Japan's mergers and acquisitions (M&As) during the country's 1990s banking crisis indicates that acquirers with stronger bank ties made acquisitions that they would not have normally made. These acquirers lost more shareholder value via mergers than acquirers with weaker bank ties. The banks' risk was reduced, while the banks' shareholders gained significant excess returns from their borrowers' mergers. This paper offers implications for corporate governance of firms with strong bank ties and advances the existing knowledge on business groups.